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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4659
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DWAYNE PARKER,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00806-001
(Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 5, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(File: March 16, 2012)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Dwayne Parker was charged with illegal possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g). He moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an illegal search, arguing the
police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the vehicle stop that led to the weapon’s
discovery. The federal trial court denied the motion to suppress. We will affirm.

I.
Around 4 a.m. on October 22, 2009, after receiving an anonymous 911 call, 1
Philadelphia police dispatch issued two radio calls one minute apart reporting a robbery
in progress and a person with a gun. The two calls stated the robbery was occurring at
300 West Glenwood Avenue, which the police regard as mid-level crime area, and
identified the robbers as black males driving a silver Cadillac. 2 Within one minute of
receiving the calls, Officers Lewis and Binns arrived at 300 West Glenwood Avenue,
where they spotted a silver Cadillac Escalade SUV turn left from Third Street. The
officers could not determine how many people were in the car because of its tinted
windows. There was no other traffic in the area. When Lewis and Binns pulled behind
the Cadillac in their marked patrol car with their overhead lights off, it double-parked in
front of the gate of a closed auto garage. Based on his experience, Lewis believed this
action might be an avoidance tactic to prevent the police from running the license plate or
to avoid attention by allowing the police to drive by. Lewis and Binns pulled behind the
Cadillac and turned on their overhead lights; other officers also arrived at the scene.
While approaching the vehicle, Lewis and Binns observed Dwayne Parker, one of
the five men in the car, reaching and looking downward and making sudden movements.
After the men were removed from the car, Lewis looked inside the vehicle and spotted a
firearm on the floor where Parker had been seated. Parker was arrested for weapons
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The police repeatedly attempted to contact the complainant, but only reached voicemail.
Officer Binns recalled that the call identified the car as a Cadillac Escalade, while
another officer remembered that the call specified an SUV. The other two officers
testifying, including Officer Lewis, recalled that the call specified a silver Cadillac.
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violations. He was later indicted with a count of felon-in-possession of a firearm, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), and taken into federal custody. After being advised of his Miranda
rights, he admitted possession of the gun.
After a hearing on whether the initial stop of the Cadillac was constitutional, the
District Court denied Parker’s motion to suppress the physical evidence. United States v.
Parker, No. 09-cr-806, 2010 WL 4456919 (Nov. 5, 2010). The court held that, although
the anonymous call alone was insufficient, the totality of the circumstances provided
reasonable suspicion for the stop, which did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
*4-*7. Parker subsequently pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the
suppression motion. After sentencing, he filed a timely appeal. 3
II.
The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Fourth Amendment
permits police to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123 (2000). Reasonable suspicion requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch,’” id. at 123-24 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27), and must be
examined under the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the officer had a
“particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing,” United States v.
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The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise
jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a motion to
suppress for clear error with respect to factual findings and de novo with respect of
questions of law. United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).
3

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although
reasonable suspicion is a “somewhat abstract” and “elusive concept,” id. at 274, we have
identified several relevant factors to be weighed in evaluating the totality of the
circumstances, including (1) presence in a high-crime area, (2) presence on a street at a
late hour, (3) nervous, evasive behavior, (4) behavior that conforms to officers’
specialized knowledge of criminal activity, (5) geographic and temporal proximity to the
scene of the alleged crime, and (6) the number of people in the area, United States v.
Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 561 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 251
(3d Cir. 2006). In weighing these factors, we consider only facts known to the officers
before the stop. Goodrich, 450 F.3d at 559.
When reasonable suspicion is based on information obtained from an anonymous
source, the tip must exhibit “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable
suspicion to make the investigatory stop” without further independent investigation.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). Such indicia include whether (1) the tip
was made face-to-face, (2) the informant can be held responsible for false allegations, (3)
the tip provides “inside information” not available to every observer, (4) the informant
recently witnessed the alleged criminal activity, and (5) the tip predicts later behavior that
the police may confirm. Brown, 448 F.3d at 249-50. But the “bare report of an
unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the
[crime] nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information” is alone
insufficient to create reasonable suspicion. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000).
Nor is it adequate that the tip accurately describes a suspect’s location and appearance,
4

since “[t]he reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its
assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id. at
272.
As the government concedes, in this instance the anonymous tip the Philadelphia
police received lacked “sufficient indicia of reliability” to alone provide reasonable
suspicion for the stop. The 911 call from an unidentified informant who did not state the
basis of her knowledge possessed none of the factors that indicate reliability. 4
But this is not an instance where the police relied only on an anonymous tip to
justify an investigative stop. Cf. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268 (“The question presented in this
case is whether an anonymous tip . . . is, without more, sufficient to justify a police
officer’s stop. . . .” (emphasis added)). As the District Court noted, after the police
responded to the radio call, they observed several factors that we have held establish
reasonable suspicion. It was 4:00 a.m. and the area had a reputation for mid-level crime.
More significantly, the police arrived only a minute after the call and found a vehicle
matching the flash description at the address identified, with no other cars around. See
Goodrich, 450 F.3d at 562-63 (holding that the discovery of the suspect seven minutes
after a call within two blocks of the alleged crime scene, with no other occupied vehicles
present, “militat[es] strongly in favor of the validity of the stop”). Moreover, the suspects
4

In J.L., the Court noted that “[t]he facts of this case do not require us to speculate about
the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great
as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability,” and observed that it would
not apply the same standard to reports of a bomb, or to searches in airports or schools
where privacy expectations are diminished. 529 U.S. at 274. Accordingly, in certain
severe or emergency situations, an anonymous tip alone may be sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop.
5

engaged in what the police, based on their experience and specialized knowledge,
regarded as nervous, evasive behavior when they double-parked in front of a closed
business after the police cruiser pulled behind them. While Parker urges there might
have been innocent reasons for the Cadillac to park, “[a] determination that reasonable
suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534
U.S. at 277; see also United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In
many cases the Supreme Court has found reasonable suspicion based on acts capable of
innocent explanation.”). The issue is not whether each action in isolation might be
innocent, but whether, when taken together, they provide a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting wrongdoing that would eliminate “a substantial portion of innocent
[persons].” United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2009).
We conclude that this standard was met here. Viewing these factors together as
the “totality of the circumstances,” we determine the police had reasonable suspicion to
conduct the investigatory stop of the Cadillac. Although the anonymous 911 call alone
may not have been sufficiently reliable to justify the stop, all the factors we have
previously identified as indicating reasonable suspicion were present, to greater or lesser
degrees. Weighed collectively, they establish the police officers had reasonable
suspicion, and the stop was constitutionally valid.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Parker’s
motion to suppress. We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
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